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 The present study formalizes and quantifies the importance of uncertainty for 
investment in a corn-stover based cellulosic biofuel plant. Using a real options model we 
recover prices of gasoline that would trigger entry into the market and calculate the portion 
of that entry trigger price required to cover cost and the portion that corresponds to risk 
premium. We then discuss the effect of managerial flexibility on the entry risk premium 
and the prices of gasoline that would trigger mothballing, reactivation, and exit. Results 
show that the risk premium required by plants to enter the second-generation biofuel 
market is likely to be substantial. The analysis also reveals that a break-even approach 
(which ignores the portion of entry price composed of risk premium), and the traditional 
Marshallian approach (which ignores the portion of entry price composed of both the risk 
premium and the drift rate), would significantly underestimate the gasoline entry trigger 
price and the magnitude of that underestimation increases as both volatility and mean of 
gasoline prices increase. Results also uncover a great deal of hysteresis (i.e. a range of 
gasoline prices for which there is neither entry nor exit in the market) in entry/exit behavior 
by plants. Hysteresis increases as gasoline prices become more volatile. Hysteresis 
suggests that, at the industry level, positive (negative) demand shocks will have a 
significant impact on prices (production) and a limited impact on production (prices). In 
combination all of these results suggest that policies supporting second generation biofuels 









While analyses of the economic viability of cellulosic biofuels suggest a positive 
net present value (NPV) of such investments, entry into the market has not occurred at the 
pace set by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The present study quantitatively evaluates 
the hypothesis that, due to the uncertain and irreversible nature of investment in this 
industry, investors require a non-trivial premium on expected profitability to enter the 
market1. We also hypothesize that managerial flexibility (the possibility of mothballing 
and reactivation) may reduce such premium. Results from a parameterized real options 
(RO) analysis suggest a premium of 72% in expected profitability revealing that 
uncertainty creates a significant barrier to entry. Managerial flexibility does not have a 
significant (negative) effect on entry trigger price but, it does have a slightly more 
important (negative) effect on exit trigger price.   
 Moreover, results also suggest a potential for significant hysteresis once 
investments have been made; i.e. plants will require larger losses before shutting down 
operations. Hysteresis is aggravated by higher levels of uncertainty and irreversibility. We 
argue that renewable fuel standards are not effective in addressing uncertainty and that 
alternative or complementary policy instruments may be required to induce the level of 
investment mandated by the second renewable fuel standard (RFS2). Alternative policy 
options are discussed.  
We also compare Marshallian entry and exit trigger prices to our real options 
analysis. Marshallian trigger prices are calculated at the long run average cost and long run 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that with an industry such as biofuel, that experiences such large volatility, a price 
that breaks even (brings the NPV to zero) does not necessarily mean entry. Investors would require a return 
higher than normal to agree to take on the large amount of uncertainty. This shortfall will be addressed later 
in the paper. This drawback of break-even does not mean that break-even has no value, it is very good at 




variable cost that dictate entry and exit respectively. Compared to a break-even approach, 
these likely over-state both the entry and exit price due to the omission of the drift rate. 
However economic entry and exit theory is based on these assumptions and they provide 
another comparison for real options. Even with these entry/exit prices that are higher than 
break-even their still existed a premium between Marshallian and real option entry/exit 
prices. A firm required a 48% premium for RO entry, and once active would operate until 
prices dropped 30% lower the Marshallian exit price to leave. 
Over the past decade, the United States has increasingly pushed for the 
development of economical forms of renewable fuels. This is due to increased concerns 
over climate change, energy security, and the desire for domestic job creation. Biofuels in 
particular, and lately cellulosic biofuels, have received a large amount of attention due to 
their potential benefits in addressing these problems. The first renewable fuel standard was 
established in 2005, and expanded to the form used today with the passage of the RFS2 in 
2007. The RFS2 requires by the year 2022, 36 billion gallons of biofuel (ethanol 
equivalent) to be used annually within the United States, 16 billion of which must come 
from cellulosic sources. It also sets a cap on the maximum amount of biofuel from corn 
ethanol at 15 billion gallons. Despite many positive projections, cellulosic biofuel 
production has continually fallen well short of mandates set forth by RFS2. In 2013, 
cellulosic biofuel production totaled six million gallons. This falls 994 million gallons 
below the target goal of 1 billion gallons for the year set by the Second Renewable Fuel 
Standard (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2010).  
Numerous studies, in both business and academic realms, have used a net present 
value and/or break-even analysis to predict the price required to make cellulosic biofuel 
profitable. Using this approach, these studies routinely find that a cellulosic biofuel plant 
built today should have a positive return on the investment (Anex, et al., 2010, Brown and 
Brown, 2013, Brown, et al., 2013, Digest, 2013, Gonzalez, et al., 2012, Jones, et al., 2009, 
Petter and Tyner, 2014). Without accounting for risk it is hard to reconcile the reality of 
biofuel production with predictions of profitability by economic studies. We hypothesize 
that the inconsistency between theoretical predictions and empirical observations is the 
systematic underestimation, by the former, of the role of uncertainty as a barrier to 
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investment. It does not appear that cellulosic biofuel production will meet the 16 billion 
gallons required by 2022. 
Biofuels are defined as “transportation fuels like ethanol and diesel that are made 
from biomass materials” (EIA, 2013). Currently there are three main types (generations) 
of biofuels. First generation biofuels are produced from the sugars found in crops such as 
corn or sugar cane. These sugars are processed through various pathways to produce 
ethanol which is then blended with gasoline. Second generation biofuels differ from first 
generation since they are produced from cellulosic plant matter such as corn stover, switch 
grass, or trees rather than sugar(EIA, 2013). They have also recently advanced to the point 
where the process produces a gasoline or diesel equivalent fuel referred to as a “drop in” 
instead of ethanol, which is subject to blending limits.  Most existing second generation 
plants do produce ethanol, however, since converting biofuels to “drop in” is a recent 
development (EIA, 2013). Third generation biofuels typically use algae or bacteria to break 
down a cellulosic feedstock to produce biodiesel (Carere, et al., 2008).  
This paper focuses on second-generation drop-ins.  The advantage of a drop in is 
that existing combustion engines can burn it without any modifications. This chemical 
similarity to petroleum-derived fuels gives second-generation biofuels an advantage over 
ethanol as it eliminates constraints on blending (Tyner, et al., 2011). Nine trillion dollars’ 
worth of transportation infrastructure exists in the United States to handle petroleum-based 
products (Halog and Bortsie-Aryee, 2013). Pipelines cannot transport ethanol and most 
cars cannot burn a mixture that contains more than ten to fifteen percent ethanol without 
damaging the engine (Blanco and Isenhouer, 2010, Tyner and Taheripour, 2014).  
Typically large-scale investment projects such as second generation biofuel 
refineries must pass some kind of cost-benefit analysis to judge the profitability of the 
investment before construction can be started.  Usually, a net present value analysis is used. 
While this can be useful in established stable industries, evaluating investment in a new 
industry that experiences large amounts of uncertainty from both technical and market 
sources requires consideration of the effects of uncertainty on entry and exit behavior (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994, Gonzalez, et al., 2012). This uncertainty translates into a value, for 
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having the option to wait to make a decision. Waiting allows the decision maker to observe 
the evolution of random variables and re-assess the risk associated with the investment.2 
One way of formalizing and quantifying the value of waiting and, consequently, 
the role of uncertainty in entry trigger prices is using a real options analysis. Factoring 
uncertainty into the cost/benefit analysis for entry into the biofuel supply chain has recently 
gained popularity (Brandão, et al., 2009, Burke, 2012, Pederson and Zou, 2009, Schmit, et 
al., 2009, Song, et al.) but this approach has not been applied to the analysis of investment 
in a second generation drop-in biofuel plants. This paper fills this gap by developing a real 
options model of a plant’s decision making for optimal entry, exit, mothball, and 
reactivation trigger prices for a second-generation corn stover fed biofuel plant. Moreover, 
we calculate entry and exit trigger prices with a real options model that ignores the 
managerial flexibility embedded in mothball and reactivation. Solving a real options model 
with and without mothball and reactivation allows identification of the risk premium 
required by investors to enter the market and the offsetting effect of managerial flexibility. 
In particular, the difference in trigger prices between the break-even approach and 
real options without considering mothballing and reactivation permits quantification of the 
effect of uncertainty on entry trigger price. In turn this will reveal the magnitude of the 
underestimation of uncertainty, embedded in the break-even approach which may explain 
the puzzling difference between predictions of profitability and absence of entry into the 
industry. On the other hand the difference in trigger prices between real options with 
mothball and reactivation and real options without these intermediate states permits 
quantification of the effect of managerial flexibility, given uncertainty and irreversibility, 
on the risk premium that investors require to enter the market. 
  
                                                          
2 It is important to note that it is possible to build uncertainty into an NPV analysis. More specifically one 
can specify a percent chance of economic loss that is acceptable and build that into the trigger price for entry. 
This will yield a positive NPV. This qualification will create a trigger price for entry that is higher than the 
break-even price. In this paper, unless otherwise specified, we compare real options trigger price for entry 
(exit) to break-even and (Marshelian exit prices). We also create a situation with an 80% chance of economic 









 As mentioned earlier, this paper compares the entry and exit trigger prices for a real 
options framework to an NPV break-even framework to come up with a price premium for 
uncertainty. The break-even model is centered on standard discounting. Revenue and costs 
are discounted for the future at a pre-specified discount rate. The summation of all of these 
expected discounted values are put together to come up with the value of a project in 
today’s dollars. Under NPV break-even assumptions a firm will enter the market if their 
discounted price is greater than or equal to their discounted operating cost plus capital 






+ 𝑘. 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ denotes the trigger price per 
gallon for entry, 𝛿 the discount rate, µ the drift rate in price, 𝑤 the operating cost per gallon, 
and 𝑘 the capital cost per gallon of plant capacity. A firm will exit the market if the 
discounted price falls below discounted operating cost plus the net scrap value of selling 
the plant. In other words a firm will leave if the present value of its revenue cannot cover 







+ 𝑙. 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙 denotes the trigger price per gallon for exit and 𝑙 the net scrap value 
of selling the plant.  
 We also compare RO entry and exit to Marshallian entry and exit. Under 
Marshallian assumptions, a firm will enter if its average price can cover its average cost. 
More specifically, the Marshallian entry trigger price, 𝑊ℎ , is the long run average cost, 
composed of operating cost 𝑤 and the interest 𝑟 on sunk capital cost 𝑘. Entry occurs when 
𝑊ℎ ≥ 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑘. The Marshallian exit trigger price 𝑊𝑙 is the operating cost 𝑤 plus the 
interest 𝑟 on scrap value 𝑙. Exit occurs when 𝑊𝑙 < 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑙 (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). While 
NPV-break even assumptions are more comparable to real options they can leave 
ambiguity for what the actual entry/exit prices will actually be when they deal with an 
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industry experiencing large amounts of uncertainty.3 While Marshallian entry/exit diverges 
from both the assumptions of uncertainty and drift, it does provide an unambiguous entry 
and exit point anchored in rigorously proven economic theory. 
 
Real Options Defined 
The real options analysis and corresponding intuition used in this paper is taken 
from (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The process has already been developed but the rest of 
this chapter is dedicated to explaining and showing how real options affect trigger prices 
for entry and operation. Real options are to project investment, what financial options are 
to stock or commodity investment. Both of these options give the right but not the 
obligation to make a decision in the future. This right without obligation mitigates the 
downside risk associated with an investment project while still allowing to capitalize from 
the upside. The value of this option is captured and quantified in a real options analysis. 
For the option to invest to have value (i.e. for the real options approach to differ from the 
break-even approach), three conditions must hold: 
1. Investment cost is either fully or partially irreversible. 
2. The future evolution of one of the variables in the model is uncertain. 
3. Timing of the investment can be controlled.                                                                                                    
Biofuel plants are large investments that have little reversibility. Much of the 
equipment is specific to the industry. A tank used for pyrolysis may cost millions of dollars 
by the time it is installed but if the industry becomes unprofitable it does not have many 
other uses. For instance if one plant becomes unprofitable due to a systemic risk in the 
industry, such as low gasoline prices, the only other firms that would be interested in 
purchasing a pyrolysis tank would be firms in the same industry. They however would not 
buy it upon the initial plant’s exit for anywhere near its purchase price since they are also 
experiencing low prices and as a result are in a similar position. 
Wholesale gasoline price per gallon is used as a proxy for the price received for a 
gallon of drop in biofuel. Using, converting, and logging monthly data covering the past 
                                                          
3 As mentioned previously, it is important to note that NPV can account for uncertainty by specifying a 
percentage chance for economic profit, but this in itself leads to the problem of specifying what percent of 
gain would induce entry. 
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five years from the EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), the average annual 
standard deviation for a percentage change in wholesale gasoline selling price was found 
to be 0.209. Such deviations would cause drastic swings in a biofuel producer’s revenue. 
An increase or decrease in prices by even a portion of the standard deviation could make 
or break a plant. This standard deviation in price satisfies the uncertainty requirement for 
real options. Finally, the timing of an investment in a second-generation corn stover fed 
bio-gasoline plant is fairly flexible. 
There are no real barriers to entry other than the high capital cost associated with 
commercial scale plants and preliminary pilot plants, which is not timing sensitive. The 
only time sensitive variable in a second generation bio-fuel plant is the potential change in 
tax policy. If subsidies and tax credits continue to change they may shut the window on 
entry. 
There is one additional assumption that must hold within the model. It was not 
mentioned earlier since it has to do with the way the model is set up and not with how the 
variables and parameters exist in the real world. The project must be assumed to have an 
infinite life. This assumption must hold to satisfy the smooth pasting conditions of the 
equalities. This assumption is accounted for by replacing capital as quickly as it 
depreciates. This replacement cost gets built into operating cost. This infinite project life, 
while necessary, has two offsetting effects compared to a traditional break-even analysis. 
Building in capital depreciation costs into operating costs will raise the trigger price since 
it essentially doubles capital cost. A producer must pay capital cost to start the plant and 
then an annual payment of capital cost for the infinite life of the plant. The infinite life also 
lowers the trigger price in the sense that price has a positive trend, costs do not. Getting 
higher prices for an infinite life compared to say 20 years will decrease the trigger price. 
  
Decisions for Entry, Mothball, Reactivation, and Exit 
 There are three different states a plant can be in: idle, active, or mothballed. In an 
idle state, a plant is not paying either fixed or capital costs since it has not been built yet. It 
is also not receiving income but has the option of activating in the future. An active plant 
pays an investment cost 𝑘 to enter the market and then, every period, pays operating costs 
𝑤, and, earns revenue 𝑃. An active plant also has the option of converting to a mothballed 
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state. To get to a mothballed state an active plant must pay a fixed cost of 𝐸𝑚 and pays an 
ongoing operating mothball maintenance cost 𝑚 to keep the plant in working order should 
it decide to use its option of reactivating to active in the future for a fixed cost 𝑟. In a 
mothballed state a plant also has the option of exiting the industry. In the event that the 
firm decides to exit the market, it forfeits its mothball maintenance cost, and gets a fraction 
of the initial capital, 𝑙, back. The plant would incur some costs for exiting but after 
combining them with the value it gets for selling the plant we assume 𝑙 to be positive. It 
also loses its option to reactivate.  The ability to switch between these different states is 
represented in Table 2.1. X is possible, - is not. 
 
Table 2.1: Possible Plant States to Switch Between. 
  Idle Active Mothballed 
Idle - X - 
Active - - X 
Mothballed X X - 
 
 
There are several assumptions that must hold for this model to function. We assume 
𝑙 < 𝑘. We also assume that  𝑤 < 𝑚,otherwise the firm will never mothball (Schmit, et al., 
2009). Similarly, it is necessary for  𝑟 <  𝑘, otherwise it would never be optimal to mothball 
and reactivate later since it would always be cheaper to exit and then enter again.  
The output prices that trigger entry, mothball, exit, and reactivation when the option 
of waiting to make the investment is factored (real options) in are denoted by 𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑚, 𝑃𝑟, 
and 𝑃𝑙 respectively.. The output prices that trigger entry and exit when waiting is not an 
option (break-even) are denoted by 𝑊ℎ and 𝑊𝑙 respectively.   
Price per gallon 𝑃 is the wholesale price of a gallon of bio-gasoline. This price is 
assumed to change over time according to a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) process.4 
This process not only changes over time but is also continuous in time. In other words 
                                                          
4 This assumption is supported by statistical tests conducted with historical gasoline price data. Tests will be 
presented and discussed in detail in Section 3.1. 
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decisions can be made at infinitesimally small units of time. GBM is a stochastic process 
that incorporates both a drift parameter and a variance parameter for making predictions in 
future prices. The equation for this is denoted as 𝑑𝑃 = µ𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧. A change in price 
(𝑑𝑃) is dependent upon its drift rate and its variability. Drift rate grows over a time 
increment (𝑑𝑡). The standard deviation is tied to the increment of a Weiner process denoted 
by 𝑑𝑧, which is a function of time and variability, = 𝑡√𝑑𝑡 . The factor 𝑡 is a normally 
distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, so the 
expected value of 𝑑𝑧 = 0. 𝑃 follows a normal distribution. Gasoline prices have typically 
been characterized by log-normal distributions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Gasoline prices 
enter our model in log form. Given log-normality of gasoline price, the log of gasoline 
price is characterized by a normal distribution. It is also assumed that the discount rate 𝛿 is 
greater than the drift rate µ. This must hold otherwise it would never be optimal to invest 
since the growth rate would outpace the discount rate. It would always be possible to do 
“better” by waiting longer. 
 
The Decision to Enter 
 Let us denote an idle project’s discounted expected value by 𝑉0(𝑃). For an idle 
plant, this value is completely based off of the option for the firm to enter the industry in 
the future. An idle plant has no revenue or expenses, but has the option of earning a profit 
in the future if the option is exercised and the plant is brought to an active state. An investor 
that owns a plant in an idle state could do one of two things, hold onto the option and 
activate the plant if prices are sufficiently high or sell the option to someone else and invest 
the proceeds. The former is represented by the equation 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉0(𝑃)]𝑑𝑡
−1, where 𝑡 is the 
expected value of the project at time 𝑡. The latter is represented by the function 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃). 
Think of the left hand side as the return generated from selling the project and investing 
the proceeds. The right hand side is the expected capital gain of the project. Arbitrage in 
efficient markets would set these two returns equal: 
 𝛿𝑉0(𝑃) =  𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉0(𝑃)]𝑑𝑡
−1        (1) 
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Equation one is a Bellman equation and it must hold under efficient markets. 
Equation (1) implicitly defines the entry trigger price. To solve for this price we first need 
to find an expression for 𝑑𝑉0(𝑃). This expression reveals that the value of the project is a 
function of gasoline price which is, in turn, a random variable following a geometric 
Brownian motion (BM) process.  To obtain an expression for solve this we make use of 






where  𝑑𝑃 = µ𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧. The second order term is (𝑑𝑃)2 = (µ𝑃)2(𝑑𝑡)2 +
2(µ𝑃)(𝜎𝑃)(𝑑𝑡)
3
2 + (𝜎𝑃)2𝑑𝑡 which simplifies to (𝜎𝑃)2𝑑𝑡 since (𝑑𝑡)2 and (𝑑𝑡)
3
2 go to zero 
faster than 𝑑𝑡 as 𝑑𝑡 approaches zero. Higher order terms vanish as (𝑑𝑃)3 and (𝑑𝑃)4 will 
have all of their associated 𝑑𝑡 terms taken to a power higher than one and as a result will 







𝑑𝑃2        (2) 













 (𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧)     (3) 
We then substitute (3) into (1) and get:           












𝜎𝑑𝑧             (4) 










𝜎2𝑃2)           (5)                                                                                                                        
Equation (5) constitutes a second order homogenous ordinary differential equation. 
As such, it has the solution (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994): 
𝑉0 = 𝐴0𝑃
−𝛼 + 𝐵0𝑃
𝛽                     (6)                                                                                                       
Where α and β are parameters that capture and incorporate the uncertainty modeled 
by GBM into the model:     
−𝛼 = 0.5[(1 − 2𝜇𝜎−2) − ((1 − 2𝜇𝜎−2)2 + 8𝛿𝜎−2).5] < 0   
 𝛽 = 0.5[(1 − 2𝜇𝜎−2) + ((1 − 2𝜇𝜎−2)2 + 8𝛿𝜎−2).5] > 1 
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Where 𝐴0 and 𝐵0 are unknown constants. The term 𝐴0𝑃
−𝛼 represents the option 
value of changing states if output price decreases, and 𝐵0𝑃
𝛽 represents the option value of 
switching to another state if prices increase. For an idle plant we drop 𝐴0𝑃
−𝛼 since an idle 
project has no value if price approaches zero. If 𝐴0𝑃
−𝛼 approaches zero the first term 
vanishes rendering the following solution to the differential equation: 
 𝑉0 = 𝐵0𝑃
𝛽                (7)  
 We now turn our attention to the decision to mothball the plant after entry has 
occurred. 
 
The Decision to Mothball 
 Now that we have solved for the value of a plant in an idle state 𝑉0, we look at a 
plant in an active state 𝑉1. A plant in an active state is producing biofuel and earning an 
ongoing net revenue stream equal to (𝑃 − 𝑤). Equilibrium in the market requires: 
𝛿𝑉1 = (𝑃 − 𝑤) + 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉1(𝑃)]𝑑𝑡
−1                (8) 
 Notice the similarities of the Bellman equation for an active plant equation (8) to 
the Bellman equation for an idle plant equation (1). Like equation (1), equation (8) has an 
option value of being able to change states but it also contains a term for both price and 
operating cost to denote operating revenue. The value function 𝑉1 is derived following the 
same procedure by which we derived 𝑉0. Such procedure results in: 
𝑉1(𝑃) = 𝑃(𝛿 − µ)
−1 − 𝑤𝛿−1 + 𝐴1𝑃
−𝛼 + 𝐵1𝑃
𝛽    (9) 
Where 𝐴1 and 𝐵1 are unknown constants, 𝐴1𝑃
−𝛼 and and 𝐵1𝑃
𝛽which capture the 
option value of mothballing the plant if output price decreases and the option value of 
mothballing if the output price increases respectively. If the output price is sufficiently high 
to induce the firm to keep the plant active, further increases in output price will make the 
value of mothball vanish; i.e. 𝐵1𝑃
𝛽=0. Therefore equation (9) simplifies to:   
𝑉1(𝑃) = 𝑃(𝛿 − µ)
−1 − 𝑤𝛿−1 + 𝐴1𝑃
−𝛼     (10) 
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We now look at a situation where a firm that has a mothballed, the plant has the 
option to reactivate or exit the market altogether.  
 
The Decision to Reactivate or Exit 
 Now think of a plant that is currently in a mothball state. It is experiencing an 
ongoing maintenance cost of 𝑚. The bellman equation for a plant in a mothballed state is: 
𝛿𝑉𝑚 = 𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑉𝑚(𝑃)]𝑑𝑡
−1 − 𝑚       (11) 
 Once again, the left hand side represents the return from selling the plant and 
investing the proceeds. The right hand side represents the expected value of keeping the 
project. By using the same process that was used for equations (1) and (8) this equation 
converts to: 
 𝑉𝑚(𝑃) = 𝐴𝑚𝑃
−𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚𝑃
𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿−1      (12) 
 Where 𝐴𝑚 and 𝐵𝑚 are unknown constants, 𝐴𝑚𝑃
−𝛼 represents the option value of 
being able to exit, 𝐵𝑚𝑃
𝛽 represents the option value of being able to reactivate, 𝑚𝛿−1 
represents the present value of maintenance cost if the plant never changes states. The 
option value to exit is positive only if the price decreases, and the option value to reactivate 
is positive only if the price increases. This is why each option only has one term associated 
with it. 
 
Deriving the Trigger Prices 
 Our representative plant has the option to switch from idle to active, active to 
mothballed, mothball to exit, and mothballed to active at any given point in time. Each of 
these options will be exercised at a specific price which we denote by 𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑚, 𝑃𝑟, and 𝑃𝑙, 
respectively. These prices are referred to as trigger prices. Trigger prices are characterized 
by two conditions known as the value matching condition and the smooth pasting condition 
at each switching point. The value matching condition states that switching from one state 
to another occurs when the value of the current state becomes lower than the value of the 
project under the state to which the firm would like to switch minus the fixed exercise price 
(or switching cost) which we denote by 𝑘, 𝐸𝑚, 𝑟, and 𝑙 when the firm switches to active, 
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mothball, reactivation, and exit respectively. The smooth pasting condition requires these 
value functions to be tangent to one another at the trigger price. 
 We start by looking at the trigger price for switching a biofuel plant from an idle 
state to an active state. The value matching condition occurs between these two states at a 
value of 𝑃ℎ that sets the value of the option to enter equal to the value of an active project 
minus the fixed cost of switching states 𝑘:   
 𝑉0(𝑃ℎ) = 𝑉1(𝑃ℎ) − 𝑘        (13) 
The corresponding smooth pasting condition between these two states is:            
𝑉′0(𝑃ℎ) = 𝑉′1(𝑃ℎ)        (14) 
 The value matching condition corresponding to the transition from active to 
mothball can be denoted by:           
 𝑉1(𝑃𝑚) = 𝑉𝑚(𝑃𝑚) − 𝐸𝑚       (15) 
Where 𝑃𝑚 represents the trigger price that will take a plant from an active state to a 
mothballed state and 𝐸𝑚 denotes the fixed cost of mothballing. The corresponding smooth 
pasting condition between active and mothballed states is:         
 𝑉′1(𝑃𝑚) = 𝑉′𝑚(𝑃𝑚)        (16) 
A mothball state has two options for switching states. It can change back to an 
active state for a fixed reactivation cost of 𝑟. It could also change back to an idle state and 
receive a net scrap value 𝑙. Since there are two options for this state there needs to be both 
two value matching conditions and two smooth pasting conditions satisfied. The decision 
to move from a mothballed state to an active state occurs at 𝑃𝑟. The value matching 
condition for this is:    
           𝑉𝑚(𝑃𝑟) = 𝑉1(𝑃𝑟) − 𝑟        (17) 
The corresponding smooth pasting condition is:               
𝑉′𝑚(𝑃𝑟) = 𝑉′1(𝑃𝑟)        (18) 
The value matching condition between a mothballed state and an idle state is:           
𝑉𝑚(𝑃𝑙) = 𝑉0(𝑃𝑙) − 𝑙        (19) 
The corresponding smooth pasting condition is:     
 𝑉′𝑚(𝑃𝑙) = 𝑉′0(𝑃𝑙)        (20) 
 We now substitute value functions (7), (10), and (12) into their corresponding value 
matching equations (13), (15), (17), and (19) at their designated trigger prices and the 
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derivative of the value functions with respect to 𝑃 into the smooth-pasting equations (14), 
(16), (18), and (20). These substitutions result in a nonlinear system of eight equations in 
eight unknowns. Four of these unknowns are trigger prices (𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑚, 𝑃𝑟, 𝑃𝑙) and four 
unknown constants associated with the option value of switching states (𝐴1, 𝐴𝑚, 𝐵0, and 
𝐵𝑚): 
𝐵0𝑃ℎ
𝛽 = 𝑃ℎ(𝛿 − 𝜇)
−1 − 𝑤𝛿−1 + 𝐴1𝑃ℎ
𝛼 − 𝑘     (21) 
𝑃𝑚(𝛿 − 𝜇)
−1 − 𝑤𝛿−1 + 𝐴1𝑃𝑚
𝛼 = 𝐴𝑚𝑃𝑚
𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚𝑃
𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿−1 − 𝐸𝑚   (22) 
𝐴𝑚𝑃𝑟
𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚𝑃𝑟
𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿−1 = 𝑃𝑟(𝛿 − 𝜇)
−1 − 𝑤𝛿−1 + 𝐴1𝑃𝑟
𝛼 − 𝑟   (23) 
𝐴𝑚𝑃𝑙
𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚𝑃𝑙
𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿−1 = 𝐵0𝑃𝑙
𝛽 − 𝑙      (24) 
𝛽𝐵0𝑃ℎ
𝛽−1 = −𝑃ℎ(𝛿 − 𝜇)
−2 + 𝛼𝐴1𝑃ℎ
𝛼−1      (25) 
−𝑃𝑚(𝛿 − 𝜇)
−2 + 𝑤𝛿−2 + 𝛼𝐴1𝑃𝑚
𝛼−1 = 𝛼𝐴𝑚𝑃𝑚
𝛼−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑚𝑃
𝛽−1   (26) 
𝛼𝐴𝑚𝑃𝑟
𝛼−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑚𝑃𝑟
𝛽−1 + 𝑚𝛿−2 = −𝑃𝑟(𝛿 − 𝜇)
−2 + 𝛼𝐴1𝑃𝑟




𝛽−1       (28) 
The first four equations constitute direct corollaries of the value matching 
conditions and the next four equations are derived from the smooth pasting conditions. 
This system is solved numerically in Matlab using the code presented in Appendix 1. 
Solution of the system without managerial flexibility (i.e. without the option to mothball 











Variable of Interest 
In order to identify the stochastic process followed by gasoline price and whether 
that stochastic process warrants the use of a real options approach we looked at average 
monthly wholesale gasoline prices in the Midwest for the past twenty years. This data is 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: History of the Average Real Wholesale Gasoline Price in the Midwest (PADD 
Area 2) (EIA, 2013) 
 
Gasoline prices seem to have followed an upward trend in this period. In other 
words there is a positive drift rate which we denote by µ. The average monthly percent 
change in price in these series results in a drift rate of 0.48%. Converted to annual this term 









































































































































that this growth in wholesale gasoline prices will continue at this rate into the future. We 
chose a more modest rate based off of the EIA’s 30 year projections for wholesale gasoline 
prices. This gives us a drift rate of 1.85%. 
 The monthly and yearly standard deviation in for a one percent change in gasoline 
price over the past 20 years are 0.1 and 0.35 respectively. The standard deviation over the 
last five years was 0.06 and 0.21 for monthly and yearly calculations respectively. For our 
base case analysis we use the more conservative estimate of yearly standard deviation equal 
to 0.21. The dramatic spikes in prices experienced in years 2004-2007, and the subsequent 
crash in 2008 may overestimate the variance for future gasoline prices.  




data is logged since wholesale gasoline prices are assumed to be log normally distributed 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Schmit, et al., 2009). Taking logarithm of prices converts this 
log normal distribution into a normal distribution, which is consistent with GBM 
assumptions. The interpretation of this logging in respect to the drift and standard deviation 
are the drift is considered the average percentage change in gasoline price in a year. The 
standard deviation can be interpreted as the standard deviation of a one percent change in 
price. We chose to use prices in the Midwest since a stover fed plant would most likely 
locate and sell there, due to the relatively high corn yields and low transportation cost to 
local markets. 
There is significant variation in 𝑃 from year to year. This variation in 𝑃, with 
respect to time, can either evolve following a stationary or a non-stationary process. These 
processes are most simply and commonly modeled using a mean reversion or Brownian 
motion process respectively (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Brownian motion behaves 
randomly and the price at time t depends only on the price in 𝑡 − 1, the drift rate, and the 
stochastic term. Mean reversion behaves similarly except that it has an additional term that 
drags future values back to a given mean or trend. This can be thought of as prices reverting 
to the cost of production in the long run(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Brownian motion is 
modeled as 𝑑𝑃 = µ𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧.  Where µ is the drift rate of P, σ is the standard deviation of 
a percentage change in 𝑃, 𝑑𝑡 is the change in time, and dz is the increment of a Weiner 
process. On the other hand, a mean reversion process is modeled as 𝑑𝑃 = ɳ(?̅? − 𝑃)𝑑𝑡 +
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𝜎𝑑𝑧, where  𝑃 represents the mean value which 𝑃 tends to revert to and ɳ  is the speed at 
which this reversion occurs. 
 For Brownian motion, the price in the current period 𝑃𝑡 is a function of the price 
in the preceding period 𝑃𝑡−1, the variability of price σ, and the drift rate µ. The validity of 
assuming a Brownian motion as the data generating process (DGP) of gasoline prices is 
evaluated by conducting a unit root test for non-stationarity/autocorrelation of the price 
series. If the price in any given period depends on the price in the previous period, then a 
Dickey Fuller unit root test will fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
(Wooldridge, 2012). Mathematically this explanation is modeled as 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1 = 𝑎 +
𝑏(𝑃𝑡−1) + 𝑒, 𝑃𝑡=𝑎+𝑏(𝑃𝑡−1 )+𝑐µ+𝑒 where 𝑃𝑡 is the price in this period, 𝑃𝑡−1 is the price 
lagged by one period, 𝑎 is the intercept, 𝑒 is the residual, and 𝑏 = 𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 0 𝑜𝑟 1.  If 𝑏 = 1 
non-stationarity exists within our data set. If b=0 the data is stationary.  
Non-stationarity would mean that correlation between the two periods cannot be 
statistically rejected and it would legitimize the use of Brownian motion over a mean 
reverting process. If correlation between prices in last period and this period can be 
rejected, the unit root test will reject the null. In this case the mean reverting process is the 
preferred assumption.  
We conducted two unit root tests.5 We first conducted a Dickey Fuller test based 
on a specification where only lagged wholesale gasoline real price was included as an 
explanatory variable of gasoline wholesale real price at time 𝑡. We then conducted another 
Dickey Fuller test on a specification where wholesale gasoline price at time 𝑡 is regressed 
on lagged real prices at time 𝑡 − 1 and drift. The null hypothesis was that the data followed 
a non-stationary process and that the price in this period was perfectly correlated with the 
price last period.  The test fails to reject nonstationarity with the first specification (test 
statistic of -1.48) but the test rejects nonstationarity under the second specification (test 
statistic of -3.50). These answers give conflicting results. Failing to reject nonstationarity 
would suggest that Brownian motion would be an appropriate approximation to the DGP 
but rejecting nonstationarity would favor approximation with a mean reversion process. 
                                                          
5 Dickey Fuller tests were run with STATA based on historical gasoline prices displayed in Figure 3.1 
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Dixit and Pindyck argue that prices of commodities such as oil follow a mean 
reverting process. Under this assumption, prices below the projected level have a tendency 
to increase and prices above the projected level have a tendency to decrease.                                                                                                                               
They assert that testing for autocorrelation should be done over the largest time period 
possible (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). While this adds robustness to a unit root test, and data 
for the past hundred years is available, the market structure for gasoline has drastically 
changed in the past decade and incorporating too many years detracts from the legitimacy 
of modeling the current market.  
 Despite these conflicting results, a strong case for using the Brownian motion form 
can be made. There has been a large amount of debate in the literature over the similarity 
in results given by models using Brownian motion assumptions and those resulting from 
use of mean reversion assumptions (Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck, 1999, Sarkar, 
2003). Specifically the debate has been on whether Brownian motion can be used as an 
approximation for a mean reversion process without compromising the reliability of 
results. Mean reversion has the advantage of being a more reasonable assumption in many 
markets due to economic factors working to bring the price of a product back to its marginal 
cost of production.  An example of this would be additional plants entering the industry 
under high prices or plants leaving the industry under low prices. The problems are that 
these marginal costs sometimes shift confounding predictions made by mean reversion, 
and calculations for trigger prices under mean reversion assumptions can be cumbersome 
(Metcalf and Hassett, 1995). Brownian motion has the advantage of analytical tractability 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In other words, problems modeled using Brownian motion can 
be solved by solving formulas and give actual answers rather than forcing data through a 
program that gives approximations. 
 A mean reverting process converges asymptotically to a Brownian motion process 
as the rate of mean reversion tends to zero. If the speed of reversion, ɳ, equals zero then a 
mean reversion process and a Brownian motion process will give the exact same answer 
(Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck, 1999, Sarkar, 2003). Therefore Pindyck and Metcalf 
argue that a Brownian motion is a good approximation even if the true DGP is a mean-
reverting one as long as the speed of reversion is low (Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck, 
1999). Moreover, volatility also affects the appropriateness of using GBM to approximate 
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the DGP (Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck, 1999). Results from a GBM approximation 
to the DGP are less reliable, the higher the volatility 𝜎 of the random variable. Metcalf and 
Hassett (1995) conducted sensitivity analysis and found that under a yearly volatility of 
(𝜎 = 0.25) and a mean-reversion coefficient of ɳ=0.09, a GBM approximation results in 
trigger prices that deviate from those of mean reversion by only 2% (Metcalf and Hassett, 
1995). 
 Since we have calculated volatility in our DGP, we now proceed to calculate the 
rate (if any) of mean reversion to determine the appropriateness of a GBM as an 
approximation to the DGP. To determine the reversion speed of 𝑃 we regressed gasoline 
wholesale prices over the past twenty years on its lagged price and drift rate; i.e. 𝑃𝑡+1 −
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ɳ((𝑃µ𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑃𝑡).  Where 𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡 is the annual change in price, 𝛽0 is the 
intercept of the equation, ((𝑃µ𝑡)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑃𝑡) is the difference in mean price and actual price, 
and ɳ is the reversion speed. Estimation results in yearly ɳ = 0.66  
 
Technology and Pathways 
Before getting into cost estimation it is important to note that there are multiple 
pathways to producing second generation biofuel and that different pathways can have very 
different costs and yields. This section explains the different pathways that exist and why 
we pick the pathways that we do. There are three main types of second-generation 
technology that converts cellulosic biomass into biofuels. These technologies are 
gasification, hydrolysis, and fast pyrolysis (Brown and Brown, 2013, Hughes, et al., 2013). 
There have been numerous variations of these three base technologies in small scale pilot 
plants but they still are primarily based off one of these three technologies. Gasification 
uses high heat and low oxygen to turn the feedstock into syngas, it then adds catalysts to 
this syngas to convert it to liquid fuels (Brown and Brown, 2013). Hydrolysis converts 
plant cellulosic material to sugars after the material is broken down through either 
enzymes, chemicals, or pressure. These sugars are then turned into fuel through a 
fermentation process that is typically driven by E. coli and S. cerevisiae bacteria (Hughes, 




The final technology, and the one used in this paper, is fast pyrolysis. This process 
can be roughly simplified into five steps.  
1. Biomass pre-treatment    
2. Fast Pyrolysis 
3. Solids Removal 
4. Oil Collection 
5. Oil Upgrading 
Figure 3.2: Steps of Converting Corn Stover to Bio Gasoline Using Fast Pyrolysis, (taken 
and modified from Wright et al., 2010) 
 The first step of fast pyrolysis is the pretreatment process. Stover is collected and 
ground to pieces that are 10 mm in diameter which makes them easier to dry. The stover is 
then dried to a moisture content of 7%. It is then ground again to pieces that are only 3mm 
in diameter. This small diameter assures that the stover will be efficiently used by the 
equipment. 
 The second step is the pyrolysis itself, more specifically fast pyrolysis. In this 
process the pre-treated biomass is sent to a pyrolysis reactor. This reactor rapidly heats 
stover to approximately 480𝑜 𝐶. This rapid heating converts the biomass to a gaseous state. 
This gas contains char, bio-oil, and non-condensable gases (NCG’s) such as carbon 
monoxide and methane. 
21 
 
 During the third step these gases evaporate from the pyrolysis reactor and are sent 
through cleaning equipment (either a turbine or filter) to separate the char from the gas. 
The char must be collected due to its high carbon and ash content which would harm the 
process to further refine the bio-oil. This collected char is then either sold as a marketable 
co product or can be combusted and its heat is used to assist both steps one and two for 
drying and pyrolysis respectively. Some plants also use this char to also produce electricity 
which is then used to run the plant and/or sold to the grid. 
 The forth step of this process is oil collection. During this step, the remaining gas 
net of the char is sent through an indirect heat exchanger. This rapidly cools that gas to 
1500 𝐶. Bio-oil becomes liquid at these lower temperatures and is collected. Like their 
name would imply NCG’s stay in their vapor form, this vapor is collected and combusted 
along with the char to provide heat for pyrolysis and drying. 
 During the fifth step the bio oil then can go through one of two processes to further 
reduce the oxygen content and refine it to a usable fuel, bio-gasoline or bio-diesel. The first 
option is fluid catalytic cracking (FCC). In FCC the bio-oil gets depolymerized and further 
deoxygenated. This creates hydrocarbons which can then be blended with existing 
hydrocarbon-based biofuels (Brown and Brown, 2013). The second option is 
hydrotreatment. Hydrotreatment further reduces the oxygen content, and stimulates the 
depolymerization of bio-oil by adding hydrogen and refines it into a useable fuel such as 
bio-gasoline or bio-diesel.  This paper assumes a hydrotreatment process for the refining 
of bio oil. Hydrotreatment is chosen as the process of converting bio-oil to bio-gasoline 
since has higher yields and more favorable economics than FCC (Brown and Brown, 2013). 
 Hydroprocessing is a general term that includes two separate processes, 
hydrotreatment and hydrocracking. During hydrotreatment bio-oil is subjected to high 
pressure (1000-1500psi), and temperatures (3000 − 4000𝐶). There is also large amounts 
of hydrogen added to the bio-oil during this step. This combination of temperature, 
pressure, and hydrogen removes impurities such as nitrogen and sulfur from the bio-oil. 
The second step of hydroprocessing is hydrocracking. During this step even higher 
pressures and temperatures, 4000 − 4500 𝐶   and 1500 − 2000 𝑝𝑠𝑖, are used to 
depolymerize the molecules found in bio-oil into shorter chains which are chemically 
similar to fossil fuel based gasoline. Both of these processes further reduce the oxygen 
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content found in the bio-oil until it is at a point low enough where the upgraded product 
can be used as a drop in fuel, in our case bio-gasoline. Once hydroprocessing is complete 
we are left with our drop in biofuel, which is ready to be blended or directly sold. 
Choosing a pathway for biofuel production is challenging. The estimates for yield 
and cost of different technologies change every few months. This paper attempted to use 
the timeliest numbers possible for the existing technologies but even these are subject to 
change at a moment’s notice. The technology evolves very rapidly. Potentially hydrolysis 
is just one new bacteria strain away from becoming the least attractive to the most attractive 
second-generation technology. Having said this, there are several arguments for assuming 
a fast pyrolysis with hydrotreatment as the pathway of choice. The only existing large scale 
plant has adopted a variation of this technology so there is a precedent for it. A 
corporation’s job is to maximize its profits, this can only be done with the most cost 
effective technology. Another argument is that currently hydrolysis is a fairly outdated 
technology that is better suited for ethanol production. Hydrolysis makes sugars which 
work well for refining into ethanol but are harder to refine into a drop in. Currently, there 
are no planned drop-in plants that use hydrolysis as a pathway (Brown and Brown, 2013). 
The economics and chemistry do not line up. Gasification also experiences the unfavorable 
economics compared to fast pyrolysis. In a Techno Economic Analysis (TEA) study, 
conducted by Tristan Brown and Robert Brown at Iowa State University, fast pyrolysis 
was found to be considerably more cost effective than both hydrolysis and gasification. 
The lowest minimum fuel selling price (MFSP) for Fast Pyrolysis was found to be under 
half that of both hydrolysis and gasification pathways. The MFSP for a gallon of biofuel 
on these processes were $2.00, $5.00, and $4.50 respectively (Brown and Brown, 2013). 
 
Fixed and Operating Costs 
Now that the pathway is known it is possible to parameterize our costs. This paper, 
unless otherwise noted takes its assumptions for fixed and operating costs from (Brown, et 
al., 2013). These costs are summarized at the end of the section in Table 3.3. Brown’s paper 
does an NPV analysis for a second generation drop-in biofuel plant over different regions; 
Brown models a plant that processes 2000 dry tons of stover a day. This paper takes 
Brown’s numbers for cost and converts them into a per gallon basis. The operating cost 𝑤, 
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is calculated by taking Brown’s estimation of yearly operating cost plus our calculations 
for capital replacement and federal tax. Capital replacement is added into w to replace 
capital at the rate it is used up to ensure an infinite life of the plant; this infinite life 
assumption is required for real options analysis. Federal tax is added to keep the project 
more realistic for our analysis. This yearly operating cost is then divided by the number of 
gallons of biofuel the plant produces a year. This paper breaks operating cost into four 
categories, stover cost, hydrogen cost, cost of replacing capital, and miscellaneous.  
This paper calculates the cost of replacing capital by annualizing capital cost and 
converting it to a per gallon basis. This model also attempts to incorporate corporate 
income tax into its operating cost expense. For this to work with a real options model, a 
conversion is necessary to keep the tax constant and in per gallon terms. Traditional income 
taxes overcomplicate the real options model and cause it to break down (Niemann and 
Sureth, 2004). We assume an effective tax rate on net income to be 20%, that 20% will be 
levied on the predicted taxable net revenue over the twenty year period, and converted to 
a per gallon basis. We then take the NPV of these and annualize it to come up with a 
constant tax that is paid every year. This paper also assumes that a company can pay 
negative tax. We assume the plant is part of a larger company and that a negative tax owed 
within the biofuel plant can be sent to another part of the company to cancel out that tax; 
this is relevant for early years when the plants costs are higher than its revenue.  
There are several subsidies and tax breaks currently in the industry. However, due 
to their uncertain future this paper omits all of them and looks at trigger prices free of 
policy.                                      
As previously mentioned most of this paper’s operating costs come from the 
predictions in Brown’s paper “Regional Differences in the Economic Feasibility of 
Advanced Biorefineries: Fast Pyrolysis and Hydroprocessing,”  (Brown, et al., 2013). One 
exception to this is the cost of corn stover. The literature gives a wide range of predictions 
on the cost of corn stover. The predicted cost for one dry metric ton of stover delivered to 
plant ranges from approximately $16 to $112. (Fiegel, et al., Gallagher, et al., 2003).  Other 
predictions fall into a range between $40 to $101 (Brechbill, et al., 2011, Brown, et al., 
2013, Gonzalez, et al., 2012, Perrin, et al., 2012).  
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These discrepancies in predicted cost exist since the corn stover market remains 
largely undeveloped and on a very small scale. Due to this infancy in the industry, 
assumptions for the impact of stover harvest on next year’s crop yield, the amount of 
fertilizer required to replace the nutrients lost from stover harvest, and the price required 
to induce enough farmers to collect stover to supply a biofuel plant are challenging. The 
fact that these impacts are experienced differently across areas with disparate corn yields, 
weather, tillage, and soil type compounds the prediction problem (Wilhelm, et al., 2004).  
These things can be asymmetrical in different parts of the same field, let alone across an 
entire region.  
The assumption made in Brown’s previously mentioned paper is $101 per dry ton 
of stover. This seems to be on the high end of most of the predictions. The assumption 
made in this study is that a refinery can buy a ton of stover at $83 a dry ton. This assumption 
is used since it falls towards the middle of the other predictions. It is also the assumption 
used in another of Brown’s papers “Techno-Economic Analysis of Biomass to 
Transportation Fuels and Electricity via Fast Pyrolysis and Hydroprocessing,” (Brown and 
Brown, 2013) as well as a (Wright, et al., 2010). While $83 a ton may seem conservative 
compared with other $100 plus predictions, this paper contests that any second-generation 
biofuel plants that come online in the near future will likely pick a location that has 
favorable conditions for collecting stover, conditions that keep both the opportunity and 
monetary cost of stover harvest low. 
There was also disagreement on the yield of bio-gasoline per dry ton of feedstock. 
The predictions were, 72 gallons of bio-gasoline per dry ton and 85 gallons of bio-gasoline 
per dry metric ton, made by Kior and Brown, respectively (Brown, et al., 2013, Digest, 
2013). Kior’s assumption is used in this paper. As of right now, they are the only 
commercial scale cellulosic biofuel drop-in plant. They would know what their own yields 
are. It is important to note that some studies suggest up to a ten percent yield reduction 
converting from yellow pine to corn stover for a feedstock (Brown, et al., 2013, Demirbas, 
2011).  Kior’s primary feedstock is yellow pine but they claim they can use stover just as 
easily without mentioning a yield loss so this is the number that will be used.  With these 
assumptions in mind the cost of corn stover per gallon of biofuel is projected to be $1.15 
per gallon in real terms. 
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Table 3.1 illustrates the calculated components that make up this models operating 
cost. All these components, with the exception of capital replacement cost, were calculated 
from Brown’s paper. In Brown they were listed as yearly costs but this paper converted 
them to a per gallon basis for the model. These individual values only have a direct 
importance to our analysis in how they affect w. It is however interesting to include them 
to illustrate what 𝑤 is actually composed of. Almost half of 𝑤 comes from stover cost, 
approximately one third comes from capital replacement, and about a fifth comes from 
hydrogen. These three expenses drive the operating cost for cellulosic bio gasoline 
production. A plants operating cost is very sensitive to these two inputs. 
It should be noted that part of the costs in the miscellaneous category are negative. 
Char has multiple productive uses, this model assumes that the char left over from pyrolysis 
is burnt and converted to electricity. This electricity runs the plant and the excess is sold to 
the grid. Building electricity into the operating cost is required for our model, but it does 
understate miscellaneous cost by about $0.20 a gallon.  
 
Table 3.1: Operating Costs per Gallon for Project. 
 Stover  $                    1.15 
 Hydrogen  $                    0.51 
 Depreciation upkeep  $                    0.79 
 Misc  $                    0.11 
  
 Total investment cost is calculated to be $429,000,000 and total yearly operating 
cost is $121,491,887.  After calculating and converting the cost variables found in the 
literature, operating cost (including stover cost) is equal to 𝑤 = $2.56 per gallon and 
capital cost is equal to 𝑘 = $9.91  per gallon of plant capacity. Typically a plant pays its 
capital costs fully or partially with financing which would be spread out over a number of 
years. Real options does not allow for this, and 𝑘 must be paid all at once. Our model 
assumes 100% loan financing for only the three years of construction. We then took the 
principal of this loan after three years, paid it all at once, and divided by output per year to 
get 𝑘. Notice that the financing assumption was only used to calculate the principal, it was 
not assumed to be paid back over twenty years. 
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In this paper, capital cost 𝑘, is calculated as the present value of investment cost. 
The construction period is three years. The plant pays back the investment cost with interest 
in full after three years of construction. This cost is then divided by the total number of 
gallons produced in a year to get 𝑘. Think of 𝑘 as the capital cost per gallon of plant 
capacity. Investment cost parameters are summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 3.2: Assumptions for Financing 
Parameter Value Source 
 Investment cost   $429,000,000  Brown et al. 2013 
 Construction time  3 years Wright et al. 2010 
 % of investment in year one  8% Wright et al. 2010 
 % of investment in year two  60% Wright et al. 2010 
 % of investment in year three  32% Wright et al. 2010 
 Interest rate  7.5% Wright et al. 2010 
 PV of investment cost (after interest)  $470,350,236  Author's calculation 
 Gallons of bio-gasoline produced per year  4744800 gallons Author's calculation 
 
The parameters 𝐸𝑚, 𝑟, 𝑙, and 𝑚 are all calculated as percentages of 𝑘. Due to the 
infancy of this industry, there is little literature on the costs associated with mothballing 
and reactivation for second generation drop in biofuel plants. Our assumptions reflect those 
of Schmitt’s paper which models a real options analysis for a first generation corn ethanol 
plant. Using these assumptions 𝑚 was calculated as .025𝑘 and 𝑙 was calculated as 0.25𝑘 
(Schmit, et al., 2009). This paper made slight modifications for Schmitt’s assumptions for 
𝐸𝑚 and 𝑟. Schmitt assumes that 𝐸𝑚=.05𝑘 and that 𝑟=0.1𝑘. These numbers are taken from 
the calculated 𝐸𝑚 equaling .03k for a methanol facility. They increase 𝐸𝑚 to .05𝑘 due to 
their smaller plant sizes. 𝑟 is equal to 2𝐸𝑚 (Schmit, et al., 2009). These numbers seem 
overstated since our paper looks at plants that are both larger and have a higher proportion 
of total spending sunk into capital. Our plant is approximately four times larger than even 
the largest ethanol plants in Schmitt’s study. A first generation plant has a discounted 
operating to capital cost ratio of just over five and a half to one. In other words, over a 
plant’s life they will pay five and a half times as much for operating expenses as they do 
for capital in present value terms. The assumptions made in this paper put this ratio of 
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discounted operating costs to capital at just over two and a half to one. These plants have 
so much more capital than first generation plants that it makes sense that there would be 
economies of scale in both reactivation and in mothballing fixed cost. With this in mind 
we set 𝐸𝑚=0.025𝑘 and 𝑟=0.05𝑘. 
Table 3.3: Assumptions of All Parameters Used in this Study. 
Parameter Definition Value Scale Source 




.209 per year EIA 2014 
δ Discount rate  10.00% per year Brown et al. 2013 




                     
$2.56  





                     
$0.25  
per gallon produced Schmit et al. 2009 
k Capital cost  
                     
$9.91  
per gallon of total capacity Brown et al. 2013 
l Scrap value  
                     
$2.48  
per gallon of total capacity Schmit et al. 2009 
Em 
Mothball 
fixed cost  
                     
$0.25  




                     
$0.50  







 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
 
Trigger prices resulting from numerical solution of the system (21)-(28) are 
reported in Table 4.1. Trigger prices of entry, mothball, reactivation, and exit are denoted 
by 𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑚, 𝑃𝑟, and 𝑃𝑙 respectively. Entry and exit trigger prices calculated without 
managerial flexibility (without mothballing and reactivation) were obtained from value 
matching and smooth pasting conditions depicted in Appendix 2 are also reported in Table 
4.1 and denoted as ?̂?ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?𝑙. Entry and exit trigger prices under break-even and 
Marshelian exit assumptions are also calculated and reported in Table 4.1 for comparison 
with real options. We also calculate an NPV entry price that demands an 80% chance of 
economic profit when our risk level is considered 𝑁𝑃𝑉80%. This illustrates the difference 
in an NPV break-even analysis and what is the case for real life investment. Investors would 
want better than a fifty percent chance of making money. 
 
Table 4.1: Trigger Prices in Dollars per Gallon for Our Break-even, Marshelian, NPV 80% 
Chance of Profitability, Real Options with Managerial Flexibility, and Real Options 






𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ $                    2.89 Break-even entry price 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙 $                    2.29 Break-even exit price 
𝑃ℎ $                    4.97 RO entry price with managerial flexibility 
𝑃𝑙 $                    1.91 RO exit price with managerial flexibility 
𝑃𝑚 $                    1.91 RO mothball price with managerial flexibility 
𝑃𝑟 $                    2.89 RO reactivation price with managerial flexibility 
?̂?ℎ $                    4.98 RO entry without managerial flexibility 
?̂?𝑙 $                    1.90 RO exit without managerial flexibility 
𝑊ℎ $                    3.29 Marshallian entry price 
𝑊𝑙 $                    2.76 Marshallian exit price 
𝑁𝑃𝑉80% $                    3.51 NPV with an 80% chance of profit 
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It can be concluded from the table that uncertainty plays a major role in both the 
decision to enter and the decision to exit. The real options entry trigger price 𝑃ℎ was 51% 
above the Marshallian entry price 𝑊ℎ and 71% above the break even entry price 
𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ. 𝑃ℎ was 42% higher than an NPV entry  with an 80% chance of economic profit,  
𝑁𝑃𝑉80%. Real option exit trigger price 𝑃𝑙 was 31% lower than the Marshallian exit price 
𝑊𝑙. 𝑃𝑙 was 17% lower than 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙. 
6The uncertainty combined with irreversibility within 
our real options analysis caused plants to demand a higher price to invest and accept a 
lower price before exiting compared to traditional approaches.  For our given level of 
uncertainty and drift rate it appears that break even greatly underestimates the price at 
which a firm will enter for a second generation drop in biofuel plant. It however also causes 
firms to accept lower prices for exit, although not as dramatically. Managerial flexibility 
has very little impact. Having the decision to mothball and reactivate later affects entry 
price by $0.01 per gallon. The effects on exit trigger prices are more pronounced for higher 
levels of uncertainty. At our base levels however 𝑃𝑙 is actually $0.01 more than ?̂?𝑙. A plant 
with the ability to reduce economic losses while waiting for conditions to improve will 
have no effect until standard deviation reaches 0.25 which will be discussed later. For 
levels higher than this it   will allow plants to stay in business longer than one that cannot.7 
Figure 4.1 shows how uncertainty affects the trigger price for entry at different 
levels. This graph uses ?̂?ℎ (which ignores the options of mothball and reactivation) so that 
the effect of uncertainty is not confounded with managerial flexibility. The difference 
between 𝑃ℎ and ?̂?ℎ is minimal. This is due to the fact that the value of the option to mothball 
is very low at entry trigger prices. 𝑃ℎ was omitted to keep the graph cleaner and not be 
redundant. The gap between 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ and ?̂?ℎ is very low when 𝜎 = 0. (The difference at 0% 
                                                          
6 In this paper the break-even and Marshallian approaches are slightly modified from a traditional break-
even.  A standard break-even or Marshallian analysis would not include a yearly cost to replace capital. It 
would instead have a finite project life and only calculate depreciation for tax purposes. This modification 
was made to make our comparison consistent with real options, even if it does diverge from a traditional 
NPV break-even analysis.  
 
7 Our results comparing 𝑃𝑙  to 𝑊𝑙 and 𝑃ℎ to ?̂?ℎ initially appears at odds with what the literature would suggest. 
There is however nothing intuitively incorrect with our assumptions. Both of these comparisons yield 
expected results with higher levels of uncertainty. For low levels of uncertainty they give conflicting results 
because of the drift rate more strongly affecting 𝑊𝑙 than 𝑃𝑙 . For low levels of uncertainty, the mandatory 
mothball state costs more than it is worth. This makes the firm want to exit before it mothballs. Both of these 
situations will be discussed in more detail. 
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is caused by the drift rate, which will be discussed further in graph 4.3.) Increasing the 
uncertainty has no effect on break even 𝑊ℎ since break even only considers the expected 
value. ?̂?ℎ  however, continually increases with uncertainty. Higher uncertainties increase 
the option value of waiting to invest, which in turn cause the firm to demand a higher 
premium for entry. When 𝜎 reaches 60% the firm requires, to enter the market, a price 
more than 2.5 times higher than the break-even price under NPV. 
 
Figure 4.1: Entry Trigger Prices over Different Levels of Uncertainty. 
 
Uncertainty and irreversibility in investment may result in hysteresis in firm 
behavior. Hysteresis may be thought of as inaction. Firms are less responsive to 
profitability signals because they are anticipating potential changes in these signals in the 
future. We now explore hysteresis in the case of biofuel firms that have the option to 
mothball and reactivate. In particular Figure 4.2 illustrates the link between uncertainty 
and hysteresis. The gap between 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃𝑙 in Figure 4.2 can be thought of as a firm’s 
limited response zone. An idle firm will not enter the market until gasoline price becomes 
greater than or equal to 𝑃ℎ. If a firm is already active, it will not exit the market until 
gasoline price falls below 𝑃𝑙. Therefore if the price of gasoline is between 𝑃ℎ and  𝑃𝑙 no 
entry or exit will occur in this market. The main insight provided by Figure 4.2 is that an 
increase in gasoline price volatility, which has been the case over the past decade (EIA 
2014) makes firm entry into the market more unlikely and it makes exit of firms already in 
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biofuels remain unadjusted, recent increases in gasoline price volatility, may have greatly 
diminished their effectiveness, and their likelihood of success.  
 
Figure 4.2: The Effect of Uncertainty on the Wedge between Ph and Pl. 
 The inactivity zone under breakeven and Marshelian analysis is constant for all 
levels of uncertainty. Using break-even a firm will enter if 
𝑃
𝛿−µ
 ≥  
𝑤
𝛿
+ 𝑘. Once entered 
that same firm would only leave if 
𝑃
𝛿−µ
 ≤   
𝑤
𝜕
+ 𝑙. A firm will enter the industry if their 
discounted price covers their discounted operating costs and lump sum capital cost. They 
will leave once their discounted price falls below their discounted operating costs plus the 
lump sum value the firm receives for selling their plant upon leaving the industry. For NPV 
break-even analysis the zone of inaction occurs because difference between 𝑘 and 𝑙. Under 
our assumptions, this inactivity zone is equal to $0.60 per gallon.  
Criteria for Marshallian entry and exit is similar, the difference being Marshallian 
assumes both constant cost and price, and uses interest payments on capital, 𝑖𝑘 to calculate 
capital cost rather than capital’s  present value 𝑘. A firm will enter if it can cover its average 
cost,  𝑊ℎ ≥  𝑤 + 𝑖𝑘.  If a firm cannot cover their average cost in the long run they will exit                  
 𝑊𝑙 ≤  𝑤 + 𝑖𝑙.  The inactivity zone associated with Marshallian entry and exit also occurs 
because of the difference between entry capital cost and exit capital cost. Under our 
assumptions it is equal to $0.53.  
Real options analysis, on the other hand, has more flexibility. Its inaction zone is 
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entry and exit is known as the firm’s limited response zone, this zone increases with 
uncertainty and is considerably larger than its break-even/Marshelian exit counterpart. 
Under our assumptions of σ=0.209 and µ=1.85% the inaction zone between 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃𝑙 is 
$3.06. 
 
Figure 4.3: The Impact of Uncertainty on Hysteresis with Plant Flexibility. 
 Figure 4.3 additionally incorporates the trigger prices for mothball and reactivation 
over different levels of uncertainty. These interactions between entry, mothballing, 
reactivation, and exit, show us how a plant will respond to different bio gasoline prices at 
different levels of uncertainty. There is a hysteresis between the mothball and reactivation 
price that grows with uncertainty. An active firm will wait longer to mothball under higher 
levels of uncertainty and a mothball firm will wait longer under higher levels of uncertainty 
to reactivate. Figure 4.3 shows some interactions between trigger prices that may seem 
counter intuitive for low levels of variability (levels below 0.30). The first of these is 𝑃𝑚 
converging to 𝑃𝑙. This is a function of how the equations are forced to interact in Matlab. 
A firm must mothball before it exits. For low levels of uncertainty, there is little value to 
the options that arise from being in a mothballed state, since prices are unlikely to change 
enough to induce a state change. There is however a maintenance cost 𝑚 that must be paid 
to stay in this state and a fixed cost 𝐸𝑚 to get to this state. This additional cost paired with 
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always exit before it considered mothballing. For a similar reason 𝑃𝑟 converges to 𝑃𝑙 for 
low levels of uncertainty. A firm would not spend any time in the mothballed state and 
would exit immediately. It would never have a chance to reactivate. 𝑃𝑚 and 𝑃𝑟 are trivial 
under low levels of variability. For these low levels there is a mandatory fixed cost to 
change states, and for a mothballed state an operating cost; this is paired with these options 
having little value. In reality a firm would never consider mothballing for uncertainty 
below .30 and as a result never would consider mothballing. Because of the previously 
stated argument, we set 𝑃𝑟 and 𝑃𝑚 equal to 𝑊ℎ for levels of uncertainty that would have 
yielded a result of a lower trigger price for them than the Marshelian exit price. 
The positive drift rate calculated for wholesale gasoline price reveals an expected 
improvement in profitability. We explore whether such expected improvement in future 
profitability affects entry trigger price and to what extent that effect is magnified or 
softened by uncertainty and irreversibility. As expected, increases in the drift rate reduce 
entry trigger prices. As the prospects of the investment improve, plants require a lower 
price to invest without delay. Figure 4.4 also reveals that uncertainty and irreversibility 
soften the effect of an increase in the drift rate on entry trigger price; i.e. on Figure 4.4 the 
slope for ?̂?ℎ is less steep than 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ. The effect of an increased drift has conflicting effects 
on ?̂?ℎ. Like break-even, a project that trends towards increasingly favorable situations 
makes investment now more attractive since it lowers the likelihood of negative outcomes, 
but it also increases the value of waiting. Waiting with a positive drift rate becomes more 
valuable, because future prices are now discounted by (𝛿 − µ) instead of just 𝛿.  
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We explore the sensitivity of hysteresis (the range of inaction) to the drift rate. 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.5. Increases in drift rate have a close to proportional effect 
on entry and exit trigger prices. Specifically, they decrease at a modest rate as the drift rate 
increases. This furthers the argument that uncertainty and irreversibility are the important 
drivers of hysteresis within the biofuel industry.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: The Effect that Yearly Drift Rate Has on the Hysteresis between ?̂?𝒉 and ?̂?𝒍 
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show how much of the gap between 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ (𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙) and 𝑃ℎ (𝑃𝑙) 
is explained by uncertainty, and how much comes from the additional flexibility in decision 
making our model adds that break-even and Marshelian theory do not account for. In other 
words, the option to mothball and reactivate make the plant more realistic but it makes the 
trigger price for exit lower than it would be if we were to compare NPV break even entry 
and exit to a real options analysis that only had options for entry and exit. This is due to 
being able to mothball to reduce losses in the event that conditions become unfavorable 
and reactivate it if conditions improve later for a reactivation price less than k. In other 
words it gives an additional value to waiting that doesn’t have a counterpart in break-even. 
When doing a real options analysis that modeled just idle and active states the ?̂?ℎ and ?̂?𝑙 
under the same parameters as our previous analysis, yielded prices of $4.98 and $1.90 
respectively. 𝑃ℎ and ?̂?ℎ hardly differ since 𝑃ℎ is much higher than 𝑃𝑚; with our given level 
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Since this is unlikely the option value to mothball when a firm is experiencing 𝑃ℎ is very 
low, it would not outweigh the fixed and operating cost of mothballing.  
The impact that managerial flexibility has on 𝑃𝑙 is clear. A firm will wait longer to 
exit if it has the option to reduce its losses and reactivate in the future. This lowering of the 
exit trigger price will increase the hysteresis between entry and exit. In our analysis this 
holds true for any standard deviation greater than 0.22. The reason this is not the case for 
all levels of uncertainty is that for low levels of uncertainty the cost of mothballing does 
not outweigh the option value of being able to reactivate in the future. The impact that 
managerial flexibility has on 𝑃ℎ is less clear. It has very little effect on it which makes 
sense given how unlikely it is at high prices, that mothballing would be used. Overall the 
effect that managerial flexibility has on 𝑃ℎ is trivial but it is important to explain why it 
changes.  
 
Figure 4.6: Effect of Managerial Flexibility on the Decision to Enter. 
Figure 4.6 shows how small of an effect that managerial flexibility actually has on 
the decision to enter for different levels of uncertainty. The lines for 𝑃ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?ℎ fall right 
on top of one another. Uncertainty affects the decision to enter for a plant with, and a plant 
without managerial flexibility the same. This furthers the argument that at the high prices 
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Figure 4.7 shows how managerial flexibility effects exit. In figure 4.6 we saw that 
flexibilities affect on entry is negligible. For our given level of uncertainty Managerial 
flexibility has no meaningful effect on 𝑃𝑙 either. Managerial flexibility does however have 
an impact on 𝑃𝑙 for higher levels of uncertainty. For a standard deviation of .6 a firm will 
leave the industry $0.36 sooner if they do not have the option to reduce their variable costs 
until market conditions improve to a point where they can reactivate. This makes sense 
since 𝑃𝑚 is much closer to 𝑃𝑙 than it is to 𝑃ℎ. The value option to mothball has an inverse 
relationship with price. 
 
Figure 4.7: The Effect of Managerial Flexibility on the Decision to Exit. 
 Plants are willing to stay in the market and bear higher losses if they have the option 
to mothball which reduces these losses to only m per gallon instead of P-w per gallon, and 
reactivate in the future if prices improve. This explanation is apparent anywhere between 
0.22 to 0.6 standard deviation. From 0 to 0.22 however there is another affect that 
outweighs the option value of mothballing which causes 𝑃𝑙 to actually be greater than ?̂?𝑙. 
Option values increase with higher amounts of uncertainty. Under relatively low levels of 
uncertainty the option does not hold much value. In addition to this our Bellman equations 
are set up in a way that requires a firm to mothball before it exits. In the situation with 
managerial flexibility, if a plant decides to exit it must pay fixed cost 𝐸𝑚 before it can leave 
even if it goes directly from active to idle. This low option value paired with what is 
essentially an additional cost to exit causes the firm to leave earlier in the situation where 
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The large amount of existing literature puts the break-even entry price of a second 
generation drop in biofuel plant anywhere between $2.00 to $2.70 a gallon for a 
commercial scale plant (Anex, et al., 2010, Brown, et al., 2013, Digest, 2013, Jones, et al., 
2009, Petter and Tyner, 2014, Wright, et al., 2010). If we assume a biofuel selling price 
equal to that of wholesale gasoline price, which is currently $2.79 a gallon, one would 
expect that, even under the least promising break-even analysis, NPV for a second 
generation biofuel plant would be greater than zero (EIA, 2014). It is important to note that 
a positive NPV does not guarantee investment in the real world, if these NPV’s required 
an economic gain with greater than 50% probability then this would not be the case. By 
definition though this would require accounting for and building risk into the model. 
Despite this positive NPV, the United States is in a situation where it is well short of its 
Renewable Fuels Mandate for cellulosic biofuels every year. This shortfall has been 
considerable. In 2013, cellulosic biofuel production totaled six million gallons. This falls 
994 million gallons below the target goal of 1 billion gallons set by the Renewable Fuel 
Standard (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2010). This gap between the break even and actual price 
is caused by uncertainty.  
This chronic shortfall in investment in cellulosic biofuel plants is easily rationalized 
when uncertainty and irreversibility, two distinctive features of this industry, are 
considered. The market for gasoline has been known to be volatile. Using wholesale 
monthly data over the last twenty years we calculated a yearly standard deviation of 
gasoline price of just under .21. This volatility has a large effect on the option value of 
waiting and gives us an entry trigger price of $4.98 per gallon under real options as opposed 
to $2.89 and $3.29 per gallon, using NPV break even and Marshallian entry criteria 
respectively. Both of which, emerge under conventional microeconomic theory (i.e. when 
uncertainty and irreversibility are ignored). In other words gasoline prices have been high 
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enough to induce investment under a break-even model that ignores uncertainty. Once 
uncertainty and irreversibility are added into the calculation, prices fall well short of the 
trigger price for entry. It then follows that uncertainty constitutes a significance barrier to 
meeting the Renewable Fuel Standard for cellulosic biofuel. 
Another conclusion to be drawn from the data is that once firms are in the industry 
they will stay in longer before exiting under a real options analysis than they would under 
a break-even/Marshelian analysis for all levels of uncertainty. Hysteresis between entry 
and exit increases with higher levels of uncertainty. Drift rates also cause effect real options 
differently than beak-even/Marshelian assumptions. They have a more modest effect on 
real options due to the conflicting effect on the expected value and option value. 
Using the insights from this study, this paper makes several recommendations that 
could allow for meeting the Renewable Fuel Standard in a more cost effective way. Since 
the RFS was started for cellulosic biofuels policies primarily have been designed to address 
expected value, lowering costs, or offering attractive financing that improves NPV. All of 
these policies will lower trigger price but none of them address uncertainty. Results in this 
paper suggest that using government subsidies to reduce uncertainty may be more effective 
than policies aimed at affecting mean return on investment. Some ideas for reducing 
uncertainty have been developed in the literature. They include government subsidized 
insurance that guarantees a minimum price and forward contracts that lock the producer 
into a specific price in the future regardless of what the market does (Song, et al., Tyner, 
et al., 2010). In theory these policies could dramatically reduce uncertainty inherent within 
the cellulosic biofuel industry. It would be possible to adapt this RO analysis to these 
policies by adding in parameters associated with a given policy and then resolving the 
equations in Matlab. This is a topic of future research. 
Following the same logic, the government could reduce the perceived risk in the 
industry if they enforced existing mandates. The EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency) waives the RIN (Renewable Identification Number) mandate every year. Every 
year congress debates what subsidies for biofuels they will cut. This uncertainty involved 
within these already inefficient price subsidies makes them even less efficient to address 
uncertainty. If the goal is to induce investment into cellulosic biofuel production, the 
government could reduce the uncertainty involved in policy. While these previously 
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mentioned policies for reducing uncertainty are important, and finding a most cost effective 
one would require looking at them in a vacuum as I have discussed, this is not the whole 
story. The reality is that for any producer to get financing, they need to be locked into a 
long term offtake contract. This reality does not detract from the legitimacy of this paper 
or looking at other policy options but it is something that should be considered when 
thinking about second generation biofuel plant investment. 
All of the assumptions for costs, prices, and technology where the most sensible 
under current information; these can however change as technology and markets evolve 
and could significantly affect trigger prices. Stover accounts for about half of a biofuel 
plants operating cost. Yet there is considerable uncertainty surrounding this coefficient as 
well. Moreover the hydrogen being used in these plants comes from natural gas. Natural 
gas prices have historically been even more volatile than gasoline. Prices for natural gas 
could, and probably will change in the future. This would affect trigger prices. Currently 
Pyrolysis is the most promising technology but a single innovation in an existing or new 
technology could completely turn the tables, and alter the cost projections.  
This paper modeled how changes in price can effect entry and exit into an industry. 
While literature suggests that price is the largest determinant for entry. It is not however 
the only determinant. Costs, yields, and government policy all carry with them a degree of 
uncertainty for this new industry. An analysis done that incorporates the uncertainty 
experienced by all of these variables would go a long ways in furthering the literature on 
second generation drop in biofuel plants. 
 This study is not without limitations. While the study does account for uncertainty 
in price, it does not account for the uncertainty inherent within production. The cost of 
stover, hydrogen, even equipment can all vary over time. A model that accounts for 
uncertainties full effect on entry trigger price would also incorporate the uncertainty on the 
production side of cellulosic biofuels. This additional uncertainty would likely compound 
the already large amount of hysteresis within the industry. This limitation could be 
overcome by modeling a real options analysis for cellulosic biofuels using two stochastic 
variables, one for price and one for cost. The purpose of this study, however, was to 




 Another limitation of this study is that numbers for plant cost, capacity, and output 
are speculative. Our study gathered numbers from the most reliable sources possible but 
the fact of the matter is that, at the moment, only one large scale plant with this technology 
has existed (i.e. KIOR) and even it recently went offline. All of our information was taken 
from pilot plants, TEA’s, and modifications from cellulosic ethanol plants.  These numbers 
are the best estimations possible but they may change once data from actual large scale 
plants becomes available. This could be remedied by re-doing this analysis in several years 
when the technology is more proven and more reliable numbers exist. 
 The next logical step for this research would be to model government policy into 
it. The study has already quantified the impact that uncertainty has on entry and exit from 
the industry, it would be interesting to see the impact that each government policy, both in 
place and proposed, would have on entry into the industry. More specifically the different 
magnitudes that a fixed subsidy, variable subsidy, financing, futures contract, and the RFS 
would have on trigger prices. (Song, et al., 2010, Tyner, et al., 2010). This would be done 
by modifying the Bellman equations, specifically adding additional terms and parameters 
to model the incentive being considered. Furthermore, these policies could be compared 
on a cost effectiveness basis i.e. for every million dollars spent through a specific policy 
how much does the trigger price decrease? Judging by our results for this study, a policy 
that addresses uncertainty may be more cost effective than one that simply tries to increase 
the expected price.  
 Another option for future research would be to model the externalities of cellulosic 
biofuel production into the cost. More specifically if one could retrieve a value for the 
amount of carbon reduced, domestic job creation, etc. from a gallon of biofuel it would be 
possible to come up with a social trigger price for entry and exit that would reflect its social 
value. The hypothesis would be that a gallon of drop in biofuel would have a different 
value to society than a gallon of petroleum based fuel. This value could then be used to 
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Appendix A: Numerical Analytical Approach in MatLab 
Code 












F = [x(7)*(x(1)^beta)-x(1)*((delta-mu)^-1)+w*(delta^-1)-x(5)*(x(1)^alpha)+k; 
      x(3)*((delta-mu)^-1)-w*((delta)^-1)+x(5)*(x(3)^alpha)-x(6)*(x(3)^alpha)-
x(8)*(x(3)^beta)+m*(delta^-1)+em; 
      x(6)*(x(4)^alpha)+x(8)*(x(4)^beta)-m*(delta^-1)-x(4)*((delta-mu)^-1)+w*(delta^-
1)-x(5)*(x(4)^alpha)+r; 
      x(6)*(x(2)^alpha)+x(8)*(x(2)^beta)-m*(delta^-1)-x(7)*(x(2)^beta)+l; 
      beta*x(7)*(x(1)^(beta-1))-((delta-mu)^-1)-alpha*x(5)*(x(1)^(alpha-1)); 
      ((delta-mu)^-1)+alpha*x(5)*(x(3)^(alpha-1))-alpha*x(6)*(x(3)^(alpha-1))-
beta*x(8)*(x(3)^(beta-1)); 
      alpha*x(6)*(x(4)^(alpha-1))+beta*x(8)*(x(4)^(beta-1))-((delta-mu)^-1)-
alpha*x(5)*(x(4)^(alpha-1)); 
      alpha*x(6)*(x(2)^(alpha-1))+beta*x(8)*(x(2)^(beta-1))-beta*x(7)*(x(2)^(beta-1))]; 
 
Steps for solving 
options = optimset ('MaxFunEvals',10000,'MaxIter',10000) 
 
x0 = [5;1;1;2;1;1;1;1];  % Make a starting guess at the solution 













Appendix B: Equations Defining Value Matching and Smooth Pasting Conditions 
Without the Managerial Flexibility to Mothball or Reactivate 
Code 









F = [x(4)*(x(1)^beta)-x(3)*(x(1)^alpha)-x(1)*((delta-mu)^-1)+w*(delta^-1)+k; 
    beta*x(4)*(x(1)^(beta-1))-alpha*x(3)*(x(1)^(alpha-1))-((delta-mu)^-1); 
    x(3)*(x(2)^alpha)+x(2)*((delta-mu)^-1)-w*((delta)^-1)-x(4)*(x(2)^(beta))+l; 
    alpha*x(3)*(x(2)^(alpha-1))+((delta-mu)^-1)-beta*x(4)*(x(2)^(beta-1))]; 
 
Steps for solving 
options = optimset ('MaxFunEvals',10000,'MaxIter',10000) 
 
x0 = [4;1;1;1];  % Make a starting guess at the solution 




                                                                                                      
 
  
 
 
 
